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Co-infection with seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) and pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 could result in reassortant viruses that 
may acquire new characteristics of transmission, virulence, 
and oseltamivir susceptibility. Results from oseltamivir-sen-
sitivity testing on viral culture suggested the possibility of 
co-infections with oseltamivir-resistant (seasonal A [H1N1]) 
and -susceptible (pandemic [H1N1] 2009) viruses.
P
andemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was ﬁ  rst  identiﬁ  ed  in 
mid-April 2009 (1), near the beginning of the South-
ern Hemisphere inﬂ  uenza season. The potential for reas-
sortment of cocirculating seasonal inﬂ  uenza A viruses with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus within New Zealand gener-
ated considerable interest during the recent 2009 Southern 
Hemisphere inﬂ  uenza season (2,3). Of particular concern is 
the potential reassortment of neuraminidase gene segments 
leading to an oseltamivir-resistant pandemic strain.
Changes in the genome of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus by reassortment, recombination, or point mutation 
have the potential to alter the transmissibility, antigenicity, 
antiviral drug resistance, or virulence of the virus. Reas-
sortment can occur when 2 viruses co-infect the same cell. 
The 8 inﬂ  uenza gene segments of each virus could then be 
exchanged, creating a reassortant virus. Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 is itself a reassortant virus containing gene segments 
of avian, human, and swine inﬂ  uenza virus origin (4). We 
report human co-infection with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
and seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses.
The Study
Inﬂ  uenza viruses were identiﬁ  ed through the New 
Zealand national inﬂ   uenza surveillance system as part 
of the World Health Organization global program for in-
ﬂ   uenza surveillance previously reported (2). Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus dramatically increased demand for 
inﬂ   uenza subtyping (2), necessitating a change in the 
standard real-time reverse transcription–PCR (rRT-PCR) 
algorithm. Samples were ﬁ  rst screened with singleplex 
universal inﬂ   uenza A and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 as-
says (5,6). If negative results were obtained for both of 
these tests, samples were then tested for inﬂ  uenza B. If 
samples were positive for universal inﬂ  uenza A but not 
for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, they were subtyped for 
seasonal H1 and H3 by rRT-PCR. Samples positive for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus were not subsequently as-
sayed for other inﬂ  uenza viruses during testing but were 
tested at the end of the Southern Hemisphere inﬂ  uenza 
season as part of this study.
By testing viral cultures of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
viruses for oseltamivir resistance, by ﬂ  uorometric-inhibi-
tion assay (7), putative co-infections of resistant seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) and susceptible pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 were discovered; i.e., pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus-
es initially appeared to be resistant to oseltamivir because 
of a co-infecting oseltamivir-resistant seasonal A (H1N1) 
virus in culture. Within New Zealand, all seasonal inﬂ  u-
enza A (H1N1) viruses tested during 2009 were oseltami-
vir resistant, and all pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses were 
susceptible (3).
After the discovery of co-infection in viral culture, 
1,044 clinical samples that were positive for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 were screened by rRT-PCR for seasonal A 
(H1N1) virus. Eleven co-infections were identiﬁ  ed. Two 
additional samples indicated co-infections when viral cul-
ture was screened by rRT-PCR but could not be conﬁ  rmed 
because our laboratory did not receive the original clinical 
specimen.
Laboratory contamination of viral culture could ac-
count for the presence of both inﬂ  uenza subtypes in viral 
culture samples. Co-infection was conﬁ   rmed by using 
World Health Organization–recommended speciﬁ  c single-
plex rRT-PCRs (5) on each of the 11 original clinical spec-
imens (Table). The speciﬁ  c rRT-PCRs each are speciﬁ  c 
for the gene segment encoding hemagglutinin; 1 assay is 
speciﬁ  c for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, the other for seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1). The 2 assays were run in parallel for 
each sample with appropriate controls, including speciﬁ  c-
ity controls.
Within this small number of cases, 10 of the 13 pa-
tients were female, and 6 patients were of Maori descent. 
Each ﬁ  gure was higher than the expected 51% and 14.6% 
representation in the New Zealand population, respective-
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ly, but co-infections were too few to draw any conclusions 
based on these characteristics (Table).
A vaccine for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was not avail-
able when these samples were collected (June–November 
2009), and only 1 of the 13 patients had a history of sea-
sonal inﬂ  uenza vaccination. None of the 13 case-patients 
had severe illness or were hospitalized.
Eight of the 13 case-patients came from the central 
North Island; the remainder came from Auckland (2), Wel-
lington (2), and Otago (1). All of these regions had high 
inﬂ  uenza activity during the 2009 New Zealand inﬂ  uenza 
season (2).
For each case, details of initial and ongoing transmis-
sion were unclear. Two cases occurred in a husband and 
wife, who had onset of symptoms on the same day; the re-
maining cases are not thought to be linked. All cases were 
reported after pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had become wide-
spread in the community; therefore, contact tracing had 
ceased within New Zealand.
Dates of illness onset for all case-patients occurred 
within a 16-day period (June 14–30). This period coincided 
with the short period when both seasonal A (H1N1) and 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses cocirculated at approxi-
mately equal levels in the community, before the pandemic 
virus became the predominant strain (2) (Figure).
Conclusions
Results from oseltamivir-sensitivity testing on viral 
culture suggested the possibility of co-infections in pa-
tients with both resistant (seasonal A [H1N1]) and suscep-
tible (pandemic [H1N1] 2009) viruses. This test required 
both viruses to grow sufﬁ  ciently in cell culture and grow to 
similar titers. Only by this approach was co-infection dis-
covered and later investigated by use of more sensitive and 
highly speciﬁ  c rRT-PCRs.
Co-infections of different inﬂ  uenza viruses are rarely 
reported; reports focus solely on co-infections of inﬂ  uenza 
A and B, not of 2 inﬂ  uenza A subtypes (8–11). Two recent 
studies, 1 examining 2,273 clinical inﬂ  uenza samples with 
multiplex PCR methods found no inﬂ  uenza co-infections 
(12,13); another study estimated inﬂ  uenza co-infections to 
be as high as 3% (14). The rate of co-infection determined 
in this study was 1.1% (n = 1,044), which may underesti-
mate the actual rate because not all tests used in this study 
(either biochemical or molecular) screened for co-infection 
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Table. Characteristics of 13 nonhospitalized patients co-infected with seasonal influenza A (H1N1) and pandemic (H1N1) 2009, New
Zealand, June 2009* 
Patient
no.
rRT-PCR results, Ct  Patient characteristics 
Sample
type 
Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 
Seasonal A 
(H1N1) 
Age, y/ 
sex  Ethnicity Location
Date of 
onset
Received
vaccination† 
Received
antiviral drug
1 Clinical 22.74 18.13 29/F  E Manakau 14 No Yes 
2 Clinical 32.26 23.84 10/M M Rotorua  15 No No
3 Clinical 23.97 17.87 13/M M Wellington 17 No No
4 Clinical 26.04 32.96 18/F  E Waikato 22 No U
5 Clinical 22.67 34.68 22/F  ME Wellington 22 Yes  No
6 Clinical 22.78  35.24  19/F  M Bay of Plenty  23 Unknown  No
7 Clinical 18.03 33.58 36/M E Hamilton 23 No Yes 
8 Clinical 20.65 32.92 31/F  E Hamilton 23 No No
9 Clinical 23.69 31.5 24/F  M Hamilton 24 No No
10 Isolate 15.09 13.52 51/F  E Hamilton 26 No No
11 Clinical 30.77 22.76 21/F  U Dunedin  28 No Yes 
12 Clinical 25.1 36.62 16/F  M Rotorua  29 No No
13 Isolate 29.93 12.54 17/F  E,  M  Manukau 30 No Yes 
*rRT-PCR, real-time reverse transcription–PCR; Ct, cycle threshold; E, European; M, Maori; ME, Middle Eastern; U, unknown. 
†Patient history of receipt of seasonal influenza vaccination. 
Figure. Co-infection during cocirculation of seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
A (H1N1) and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses, New Zealand, 
2009. Red line indicates pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses; black 
line indicates seasonal inﬂ   uenza A (H1N1) viruses. The gray 
shaded area indicates weeks in which the co-infections occurred; 
numbers above the graph indicate number of co-infections for that 
week: 1 co-infection in week 24, 2 in week 25, 8 in week 26, and 
2 in week 27.of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 with other viruses, such as inﬂ  u-
enza A (H3N2) or inﬂ  uenza B.
Although inﬂ   uenza co-infections are rare, we have 
shown that they occurred during the ﬁ  rst stage of a pan-
demic when seasonal strains cocirculated. This cocircula-
tion poses a risk for further reassortment for the pandemic 
strain, which could result in a new pandemic strain. Of 
particular concern is the potential generation of an oselta-
mivir-resistant pandemic strain. The genesis of a harmful 
inﬂ  uenza reassortant warrants further investigation in ani-
mal models or in vitro systems. Further analysis of natural 
co-infections may help elucidate a role for the human host 
in inﬂ  uenza reassortment.
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